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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1952
for $1,895; that the defendant delivered to the plaintiff a check and his
1949 automobile in payment; that the plaintiff by its agents put the license
plates of the 1949 model on the 1950 car; that the plaintiff received posses-
sion of the 1949 car and the defendant received from the plaintiff delivery
of the 1950 automobile; and that no certificate of tide was issued for either
of them. Evidence backed up these allegations.
There also was evidence that, according to the plaintiffs custom, one
of its officers had to approve the trade-in allowance for the used car; that
there had been no such approval when the defendant received possession
of the 1950 automobile; that a few minutes later the officers found out
that the 1949 automobile had been repaired as a wrecked car a week before
(when the defendant bought it); that the plaintiff immediately after this
discovery demanded a return of the 1950 model-which was refused al-
though the defendant's check and 1949 car were returned to him; and that,
after gaining possession of the 1950 car at the outset of this action, the
plaintiff conveyed it to another buyer.
Sitting without a jury, the trial court gave the defendant judgment for
$1,895, with interest, because of this disposal to a third person. The court
of appeals reversed the judgment on the ground that, under Section 6290-4
of the Ohio General Code,13 since the defendant did not have the certificate
of tide to the 1950 automobile, he did not have any right, tide, claim, or in-
terest in or to the automobile; and so the plaintiff, which still had the tide
certificate, was entitled to possession of the car.
J. NORMAN MCDONOUGH
TAXATION*
Sales and Use Taxes
The cases decided during the time surveyed cover the perennial prob-
lems of which person must pay the tax and which transactions are taxable.
The supreme court in DeWitt-Jebns Realty Co. v. Glander' held that a
builder is liable for-use tax on the purchase price of a prefabricated home
which he purchases from a manufacturer outside of Ohio, and which he
erects and completes on the lot of the ultimate home owner. Under the
contract between the builder and the home buyer the sales price included the
cost of the prefabricated home as well as all other materials installed. The
builder was the "consumer" under the use tax2 not the home buyer, said the
* Constituttonal law problems of taxauon are considered under the CoNsTrruvioN-
AL LAW article, supra.
'156 Ohio St. 339, 102 N.E.2d 441 (1951)
'Ono Gaw. GODE §§ 5546-25, 5546-26.
19531
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
court Parrish v. Glander3 also was concerned with the problem of who is
taxable. In that case Parrish owned a bar and connecting restaurant. He
rented the restaurant without charge to others. They took the profits from
the sale of food; Parrish took the profits from the sale of liquor served in
the bar and restaurant. A cashier hired by Parrish handled all sales. The
business was conducted under a single name. The supreme court held Par-
rish liable for sales tax on food sold by his tenants on the ground that the
landlord and tenants constituted a single vendor under Section 5546-1 of
the Ohio General Code.
Elder & Johnston Co. v. Glander' and Nattonal Tube Co. v. Glanders
dealt with the difficult problem of drawing the line between taxable trans-
actions and transactions which are excepted under Section 5 546-1 and 5546-
25 of the Ohio General Code. In Elder & Johnston Co. a department store
purchased mats, engravings, etchings and similar materials and delivered
them without charge to newspaper publishers for incidental use in the
store's advertising. It was dear, said the court, that the materials were not
within the exception afforded by Section 5546-1 to goods purchased for re-
sale; and a majority of the court thought the goods were not within the ex-
ception granted by that section to materials used "directly in making re-
tail sales." They were used only "indirectly" or "incidentally" said the
majority. Judge Taft filed a strong dissent on the question of "direct" use.,
In the Natfonal Tube Co. case the court was concerned with the problem
of whether machinery purchased was within the exception granted by Sec-
tions 5546-1 and 5546-25 for property used" directly in the production
of tangible personal property for sale by manufacturing, processing, refin-
ing, mining, etc." A unanimous court held that ore unloaders and an ore
bridge did not come within the exception. The ore unloaders were used in
removing ore and limestone from the hold of a ship. The ore bridge
distributed such ore over storage areas and placed the ore in conveyors for
transportation to a central point as a preliminary step to its introduction into
blast furnaces.
Two further cases considered the exception contained in Section 5546-1
of the Ohio General Code, which states: "'Price' shall not include the con-
sideration received for labor or services used in installing, applying, re-
modeling or repairing the property sold if the consideration for such ser-
vices is separately stated from the consideration received for the tangible
personal property transferred in the retail sale." In Cogan v. Glander7 the
3 157 Ohio St. 274, 105 N.E.2d 249 (1952)
156 Ohio St. 445, 103 N.E.2d 392 (1952)
'157 Ohio St. 407, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
'Elder & Johnston Co. v. Glander, 156 Ohio St. 445, 447, 103 N.E.2d 392, 393
(1952)
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exception was demed a jewelry repairman who serviced and repaired
watches and who did not separately state either on his invoices or books
the cost of labor and materials. He, therefore, had to charge sales tax on
the full amount he charged customers.8 Roberts v. Glander makes it dear,
however, that if a repairman separately states his charges for services and
for materials on his books alone (and not necessarily on his invoices) he
need not compute sales tax on the amount he charges for services.
Inheritance and Estate Taxes
Two death tax cases of primary importance decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court in the past year dealt not with the Ohio inheritance tax but with the
problem of apportionment of the federal estate tax. With two exceptons,'0
the federal estate tax leaves the job of determining the burden of the tax
among the beneficiaries to state law or the expressed intention of the testa-
tor. Ohio does not have a statute apportiomng the burden of the federal
estate tax. In fact, a famous Ohio case, approved by the United States Su-
preme Court, held that, where the testator has not expressed an intention, the
residuary beneficiary shall bear the whole burden of the tax, even where
it is a charitable institution and the assets going to it would not be subject to
taX.1 I
Miller v. Hammond'2 presented a new twist to this problem. Here the
surviving widow took against the will. She was entitled under the statute"3
to one-third of the estate, the other two-thirds going to the two children. The
one-third going to the widow qualified for the federal estate tax marital de-
duction' 4 and, therefore, would not form a part of the net taxable estate. The
question before the court was whether or not the one-third distribution to the
widow should bear a proportionate part of the federal tax. A majority of the
court held that the widow's share should not have to bear a proportionate
part of the tax because her share was not subject to federal estate tax. In a
7156 Ohio St. 263, 102 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
'The court also construed Section 5546-2(9) of the Ohio General Code under the
facts of the case. The Section states that sales tax shall not apply to the following
sales: "Professional, insurance or personal service transactions which involve sales
as inconsequential elements, for which no separate charges are made." Under this
Section, the court held no sales tax need be charged where the repairman merely
serviced a watch without supplying new parts. On the other hand, the repairs cost
the repairman $2,297.20 over five years during which his gross sales from repairing
were $36,996.91.
' 156 Ohio St. 247, 102 N.E.2d 242 (1951).
°INT. REV. CODE §§ 826(c), 826(d).
1
' Y.M.CA. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), alf'd, 264 U.S. 47, 44
Sup. Ct 291 (1924).
" 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952); 52 COL. L REV. 945 (1952).
" OHio GEN. CODE §§ 10504-4, 10504-55.
11INT. REV. CODE § 812(e).
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cogent dissent, Judge Taft pointed out that the majority failed to follow the
logic of their former decision15 because in that case the charitable beneficiary
had to bear the whole burden of the tax, even though the assets bequeathed to
it were not subject to the federal tax.16 And, he further argued that the
Ohio statutory provisionS'7 requiring the executor or. administrator to pay
the federal estate tax, or make provision for its payment, before the estate
may be distributed demonstrated an intention by the legislature that the
estate to be distributed in thirds is the estate after the payment of the federal
estate tax.'
The second apportionment case, McDougall v. Central National Bank of
Cleveland,9 involved the question of whether non-probate assets, which
were included in computing the net taxable estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses, should bear their proportionate share of the federal estate tax. Here
decedent died intestate. Fifteen years earlier decedent had created a trust re-
serving to herself the income for life and giving the remainder to her sister.
The trust property constituted the non-probate assets. The court held that
the trust must bear its proportionate share of the tax.
Apportionment of the federal estate tax can be controlled in Ohio by
provision in the will. Absent such a provision, or absent a will, the results
can be quite haphazard, viz., the Miller case where, as a result of the court's
ruling, the widow's share exceeded those of each of the children by $198,000.
It would seem that the time is ripe in Ohio for the legislature to follow the
example of fifteen other jurisdictions and enact a general apportionment
statute.2 0
The state lost two reported contemplation of death cases, In re Kilgour's
Estate2' and In re Faulkner's Estate,22 in spite of the fact that in the Kilgour
case the estate had to overcome the statutory presumption that gifts made
within two years of death are in contemplation of death.23 In that case the
estate was able to introduce strong evidence of "life" motives in making the
gifts rather than "death" motives. For example, the estate showed that at
the time of the gifts the decedent had no intimations of pending disease;
that he wanted to give present financial assistance to the donees; and that
"Case cated note 11 supra.
23Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 501-502, 104 N.E.2d 9, 22 (1952).
OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 10509-121, 10509-181, 10509-182.
"8Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 497, 104 N.E.2d 9, 19 (1952)
" 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
"See Note, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax, 3 WBsT. REs. L. REv. 164
(1951); 4 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 92 (1952)
=105 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. 1951).
"' 108 N.E.2d 118 (Green Probate Ct. 1952).
23 OHIo GEN. CODE § 5332-2.
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he wanted to escape tax on the income to be earned by the donated property
ln the future.
In the Faulkner case the court also had to decide the interesting question
of whether the inter-vivos transfer was "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after death."2 Decedent deeded two farms to two un-
related grantees about two and one-half years before his death. In separate
contracts the grantees promised to pay the decedent $1,000 a year until his
death, and $600 a year to his wife until her death, if she survived the de-
cedent The court held the gifts were not taxable under the above statutory
language. The deeds to the donees created a fee sunple tide in them. Their
obligations were merely personal. A number of courts in other jurisdictions
have arrived at the same conclusion. 25
Real Property Tax
Exemption from the real property tax was the issue of primary im-
portance considered in the cases under this heading reported during the
period of the survey. The cases arose in the Cincinnati area and were all
brought by one Goldman under Section 5616 of the Ohio General Code.
Goldman v. Frmrs Club, InC.26 involved several actions brought against the
Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A. and similar organizations which maintained centers
providing rooms, restaurants and other services for which charges were
made. Despite these activities, the property in each case was held exempt
from tax. These activities were considered incidental to the organizations'
main objective of an over-all program of social, educational and religious
service to persons in peculiar need without distinction as to race, color or
creed.
Exemption was denied in Goldman v. L B. Har;Son.2  Here a wealthy
family established a building to provide rooms, meals and recreational
facilities for young workingmen between the ages of 18 and 30. For a
nominal weekly charge, the young men were provided a room, two meals a
day and the use of recreational facilities. All profits inured to the insttu-
tion. The court agreed with the Board of Tax Appeals that exemption
thould be denied because the rental of rooms and serving of meals was not
incidental to an over-all charitable purpose. The court disagreed with the
mOHIo GEN. CODE § 5332(3) (b).
'See Notes, 67 A.L.R. 1253 (1930), 49 A.LR. 885 (1927); cf. In re Estate of
Weber, 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 33 (Williams Com. Pl. 1921), af 'd, Court of Ap-
peals, Sixth Dist., October 22, 1921, rehearing denied, November 9, 1921. See also
In re Wampler's Estate, 103 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio App. 1950) in which the court
held that the probate court has the power during term to modify its order determin-
ing inheritance tax on the ground of a mistake of fact, where the tax paid has not
been distributed to the county treasurer.
" 158 Ohio St. 185, 107 N.E.2d 518 (1952).
' 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E.2d 530 (1952).
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Board's holding, however, that the part of the building used for noncharita-
ble purposes could be determined on a percentage basis and subjected to
tax and the rest exempted under the 1949 amendment to Section 5560 of
the Ohio General Code. The court seemed to feel that a division would
have to be made on an "entity" basis. Such an interpretation is quesuonable
in view of the specific language of the amendment. The court, in two fur-
ther cases,28 also reaffirmed its earlier position that veterans' organizations
devoted principally to fraternal and social activities are not entitled to
exemption as "charitable organizations."
Personal Property Tax
In Amercan Oak Leather Co. v. Peck29 the Board of Tax Appeals held
a dissolved corporation, which was still winding up its affairs, a taxable
entity subject to the personal property tax.30 It was further decided that
property of which it was disposing was "used in business" within Section
5325-1 of the Ohio General Code and, therefore, subject to valuation at
70% of its true value. On the other hand, an incubator for hatching chicks
was held in Miller v. Peck3' to be used in a manufacturing process and,
therefore, under Section 5388 of the Ohio General Code, was assessable at
50% of its true value.
Other Taxes
In Soderqaust v. Glande&- it was held that a contract under which an
employee received payments for improvements made to machines, or for
"' Goldman v. Guckenberger, 158 Ohio St. 210, 107 N.E.2d 526 (1952); Goldman
v. Robert E. Bentley Post, 158 Ohio St. 205, 107 N.E.2d 528 (1952).
108 N.E.2d 179 (Ohio Bd. Tax App. 1951)
"OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 5366 et seq.
31158 Ohio St. 17, 106 N.E.2d 776 (1952). See also Westerhaus Co. v. Peck, 157
Ohio St. 88, 104 N.E.2d 453 (1952) (upholding the Tax Commissioners application
of a depreciation formula for pinball machines); Personal Finance Co. v. Glander,
156 Ohio St. 379, 102 N.E.2d 709 (1951) (upholding the Tax Commissioner's
rule determining the amount of reserve against accounts receivable in the case of
banks and similar financial institutions, and dealers in intangibles, under both the
personal property tax and the intangibles tax)
3 156 Ohio St. 287, 102 N.E.2d 465 (1951); cf. Estate of French v. Glander, 146
Ohio St. 225, 65 N.E.2d 61 (1946).
" OHIO GEN. CODE § 5323.
" 156 Ohio St. 583, 103 N.E.2d 756 (1952), aff'd on rehearsng, 158 Ohio St. 15,
106 N.E.2d 625 (1952) (three judges dissenting) The court concluded that the
tax was illegal under 16 STAT. 272 (1870), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1946).
Cf. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665, 70Sup. Ct. 413 (1950) A majority of the court also believed that the franchise tax
itself excluded federal securities.
"State ex rel. Sherrick v. Peck, 158 Ohio St. 122, 107 N.E.2d 145 (1952) (assess-
ment of sales tax by registered mail) is discussed in the ADmNIsTRATIVE PRocB-
DURE artide, .upra.
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